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Africa News afrol News
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Africa News afrol News
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Africa remains caught between its colonial borders and the will to become modern national states. National states, however, in their historic European origin (and contrary to empires), are based on a nation. A nation is again a group of people believing they share something common, mostly a language and cultural myths. An empire is an entity where a ruing class or ethnicity dominates others, because they at some stage managed to conquest power. Most African states still remind more of empires than of national states, although they have the institutions of national states. People power and auto-determination still are seldom luxuries in today's Africa. National leaders are struggling to create national identities based on existing states (and securing their own power and legitimacy). Although rather successful in some countries, the quest for a national identity is mostly a failure, as the recent spread of secessionism, based on ethnicity, geographical or other factors, clearly shows. Africa's newest and oldest conflicts are either based on secessionism or access to resources. By most, secessionism is seen as a road to chaos, war and away from economic development. By others, it is seen as the hope of a new beginning, political freedom, means of taking the economic development into their own hands and the creation of more feasible entities. Neither view can be downplayed as wrongful, although the first - portraying secessionism as the road to chaos - has been the African doctrine since independence. There are non-African examples of successful secession processes demonstrating that the picture is more differentiated than the OAU doctrine. As the Slovaks in Central Europe demanded their secession from Czechoslovakia some ten years ago, it was peacefully granted them by the Czechs, to the clear advantage of the latter. Two differing regions thus were let to develop at their own speed, according to their own preferences. The Czech Republic already is among the first in line to enter the (still Western) European Union, the Slovak Republic probably will join some years later - both of free will - thus again to join in one political and economic union. Serbs, not letting Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Kosovo Albanians and Bosnians break free from the Yugoslavian "empire" without a war, on the other hand had to pay a large price for trying to maintain the empire. Africa has its parallels to both the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian case. The Ethiopian empire suffered from both centralist and autocratic rule, giving legitimacy to regional secessionists. Decades of resistance to the Ethiopia of (true) emperor Haile Selassie and dictator Mengistu, finally brought about the secession of Eritrea and the unity of the majority of the remaining Ethiopians (except for still subdued Somalis). The most difficult aspect to explain in this history of a region not wanting to be part of the empire, is why it had to take so long for an Ethiopian government to grant independence to Eritrea and why such a high price had to be paid. The outside world rapidly accepted Eritrean independence, including the OAU. The basis for OAU acceptance, however, is puzzling. Eritrea had once been an Italian colony, and at one stage in history had borders drawn the European colonisers. As such, accepting Eritrean independence would not contradict the OAU doctrine of the sacrosanct colonial borders being the basis for African "national states". This is also the reason behind OAU support to the independence movement of Moroccan occupied Western Sahara. Thus, the African example most reminding of the peaceful split up of Czechoslovakia has not been accepted by the OAU. The Comoros have suffered from centralist military dictatorships based on Gran Comore most of the time since independence. Reading these trends, the island of Mayotte broke away at independence and chose to remain French. As the island of Anjouan broke away three years ago, armed conflict broke out. The Anjouanese secessionist government however managed to defend its position, and negotiations started. In the Anjouanese case, the OAU presented a political solution giving some autonomy to the island, a solution that however was turned down by the islanders in a plebiscite. Direct negotiations between Comoros and Anjouan resulted in the so-called Fomboni Declaration, establishing a Comoran Confederation, if later accepted in a plebiscite. The OAU reaction to this peaceful solution was threatening to invade Anjouan and implementing a total blockade, not even letting food nor cholera medicine arrive to the island. The reason given: the Fomboni Declaration "threatens the territorial integrity of the Comoros". The "secret" agenda: letting secessionists gain ground on Anjouan would send a signal to secessionists in other OAU member countries that they also could achieve concessions. It would threaten the colonial order and the order of empires. Empires however are a costly affair to maintain if the subdue regions do not accept the situation. Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara only has produced one net gain - nationalism and national unity in Morocco proper, aiding the fairly corrupt Rabat government to divert attention from a general failure in its own development policies. The Moroccan settlements in Sahara, established to secure the legitimacy of territorial claims, are on government subsidies, not to mention the military effort in securing claims. These costs will never be paid by the relative rich fishery resources off the Sahrawi coast nor by the scarce dessert resources, which only the Sahrawi people have the competence to exploit efficiently if granted peace and auto-determination. Neither the Sudanese "empire" is gaining its costs by maintaining its 17-years old conflict in Southern Sudan. Resources, both natural and human, are not exploited but rather systematically destroyed. Military costs are extremely high. Still - there is no political will at all in Khartoum to end hostilities and negotiate another political structure, even if Southern Sudan "only" demands autonomy, making a split in gains from resource exploitation between north and south a possible negotiated solution. Why then, is there no will to loosen up "empires", even if they are so costly to maintain? Because it is the "emperors" who are still defining the rules. The OAU is the organisation of these African "emperors" - not of the peoples of Africa. And the "emperors" are among the few that gain personally from maintaining empires and do not even lose when there is a war to defend the empires. Resource exploitation in subdued provinces often are under direct control of the "emperor" or his inner circle and an empire at war usually gives even more widened authorities to its "emperor". Thus, the doctrine by OAU to "respect borders set by the colonial powers" or to maintain empires will be protected by this same association of "emperors". But the opposite forces are gaining momentum. In Congo Kinshasa (DRC) trends are going towards a secession of the eastern parts of the vast country, which culturally and geographically are far apart from the politically dominating Kinshasa. It is far too early to predict which part will win this "First African War". National unity in the DRC may very well be re-imposed on short term, but to make it lasting will be a close to impossible task. Sudan can never become a united, peaceful country under Khartoum's control again. Khartoum may win decisive battles in the future, but a stable and durable situation cannot be found until the map has been redrawn - be it a Sudanese Confederation or two separate states. The question is rather, how many more years of blood spilling does Southern Sudan have to endure before there is a will to negotiate in Khartoum. Other possible conflict herds waiting to detonate are in Cameroon and Nigeria, some of the most ethnically and culturally divided countries of the continent. In Cameroon, football (soccer) has been one of the most successful factors in keeping the country under dictator Paul Biya together. The international successes of the national football team have given some national pride and common identity. The question is, however, if it will be enough to curb the various potential secessionist parties - the anglophile south-west, the Muslim north, the exploited south-east and the "Kirdi" peoples subdued by the historical elite of the north, the Fulbe/Fulani. Conflict lines are multifaceted in Cameroon, and connected well into neighbouring Nigeria, Chad and the Central African Republic. The present national Cameroonian government, representing only a small section of the population, or only itself in the eyes of many, only emphasises the feeling of empire, nourishing secessionism. If Northerners are to demand independence, ethnic compatriots on the Nigerian side of the border are sure to become involved. If the Fulbe gain autonomy or even independence, a situation parallel to that of the Tutsis and Hutus of the Great Lakes will emerge between Fulbe and "Kirdi". Nigeria itself has first hand knowledge of secessionism through its devastating Biafra War. The oil rich Biafra region again has its independence movement, after decades of Nigerian "robbery" of its natural resources. Northerners, historically connected to the Cameroonian Northerners, are moving beyond the Nigerian federal Constitution in implementing Muslim law in their states, forcing federal government to accept an in-constitutional situation or face secessionism. Abuja under President Obasanjo still seems willing to negotiate and to accept a looser Nigerian national entity to avoid armed conflict - a sign of the truly democratic intentions of the new, democratically elected president? Other voices of secessionists are heard all over the continent. Islanders on Equatorial Guinean Bioko demand autonomy from mainlanders, totally dominating politics in the two post-independence dictatorships. In Southern Senegal, Casamance separatists have fought for freedom from Dakar for 18 years. In Seychelles, islanders from the British/US occupied Chagos Archipelago are distancing themselves more and more from the concept of Seychellois sovereignty over their islands and are now discussing the possibility of an independent Chagossian state. In Côte d'Ivoire, mostly Muslim Northerners are getting fed up with the political dominance of Abidjan. Most Sahelian states are devided between northern pastoralist peoples and southern agriculturalist peoples. Only countries, such as Mali, which have seeded power from the central government to local entities, close to the people, have been able to curb conflict and secessionism. Mali's courageous road to decentralisation and power sharing truly represents one of Africa's recent successes and the implementation of the people's power alternative. Mali's recent positive economic development also demonstrates that such a policy can pay off. But if secessionists should gain on the long run, would an Africa of 100 or hundreds of national states also have any possibility of economic development, of gaining the third millennium? Empires belong to the past. Even national states somewhat belong to the past, as the development in the European Union, MERCOSUR (South America), ASEAN (South East Asia) and other economic unions turning into more and more political unions clearly demonstrate. These new unions equal the old empires in size and external force, but beat them in economic and internal force, as they are created by voluntary participation by auto-determining peoples. The peoples of Africa will also find their way to unity, but it goes through auto-determination and voluntary participation. Unity will not be found through antiquated institutions as the OAU, defending the colonial order and representing "empires" and "emperors". It might be found through the all-African Parliament, which was decided to establish in year 2000 - if it becomes a Parliament of the peoples. It might be found through the governments truly representing, and working for the best of, its people(s). Although a country like Botswana is not ethnically monolithic, its democratic and enlightened government manages to represent the Setswana people. And unity might be found through the voluntary participation of hundreds of seceded peoples in an African Union. Africa and its peoples is on the road to claim the millennium. But it is a long road. The peoples of Africa will stand the best possibility to use their resources when allowed to determine themselves how to use them. The road goes through people's power, and the trend is set for the achievement of just that. The main question is whether the old order will be able to resist for short or for long, and how many armed, devastating conflicts the "emperors" will still head before giving into true people's power.
By Rainer Chr. Hennig, afrol.com
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