Author: United Nations (Expert panel appointed by the Secreatry-General)

Date: 16 October 2002

Title: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internal reference: Parts of [S/2002/1146]

Original language: French (translation into English by UN).

Concerning: The UN expert panel reports to the UN Security Council on the illegal exploitation of natural resources of Congo Kinshasa (DRC). The panel concludes on widespread illegal operations spearheaded by the Ugandan and Rwandan occupyers and the Kinshasa government together with its Zimbabwean ally. The panel recommended sanctions against several companies and persons involved in the illegal businesses.

Source: UN Security Council

Find here paragraphs 22-64 of the UN panel's report, concerning the Congolese and Zimbabwean government networks in the illegal resource exploitation from the DRC.

See also the introduction to the report and its conclusion. 
Other documents on afrol include the operations in 
1 - the Rwanda-controlled area; and 
2 - the Uganda-controlled area

See also Abbreviations. 

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III. Government-controlled area

22. The elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean political, military and commercial interests seeks to maintain its grip on the main mineral resources — diamonds, cobalt, copper, germanium — of the Government-controlled area. This network has transferred ownership of at least US$ 5 billion of assets from the State mining sector to private companies under its control in the past three years with no compensation or benefit for the State treasury of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

23. This network benefits from instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its representatives in the Kinshasa Government and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces have fuelled instability by supporting armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi. 

24. Even if present moves towards peace lead to a complete withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces, the network’s grip on the richest mineral assets of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and related businesses will remain. Zimbabwe’s political-military elite signed six major trade and service agreements in August 2002 with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reliable sources have told the Panel about plans to set up new holding companies to disguise the continuing ZDF commercial operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a ZDF controlled private military company to be deployed in the country to guard those assets.

The elite network

25. The elite network in the Government-held area comprises three circles of power, namely, Congolese and Zimbabwean government officials and private businessmen. Chief figures in the Congolese branch of the network are the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo, a shareholder and deal-broker for both diamond and cobalt ventures; the Minister of Presidency and Portfolio, Augustin Katumba Mwanke, a former employee of Bateman’s mining company in South Africa and a key power broker in mining and diplomatic deals; the President of the State diamond company, Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), Jean-Charles Okoto; the Planning Minister and former Deputy Defence Minister, General Denis Kalume Numbi, a stakeholder in the lucrative Sengamines diamond deal and in COSLEG; and the Director General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga, pivotal in facilitating several asset-stripping joint ventures between the State mining company and private companies.

26. The Congolese branch also includes active, but less visible members. Frédéric Tshineu Kabasele is a director of three joint ventures with Zimbabwe using the COSLEG platform — the diamond trading Minerals Business Company, the logging company SOCEBO and the First Banking Corporation Congo. The Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier Kazadi Nyembwe, has oversight of many of the private commercial operations and has been linked by several sources to arms supplies for Burundi opposition groups and Mayi-Mayi groups in Maniema and South Kivu. COSLEG, a Congo-Zimbabwe joint stock company, remains a key vehicle for military-backed commerce involving mostly diamonds, banking and timber in the Government-held areas. The Technical Director of COSLEG, Mfuni Kazadi, specializes in the writing of joint venture contracts to accommodate the private interests of the elite network.

27. The key strategist for the Zimbabwean branch of the elite network is the Speaker of the Parliament and former National Security Minister, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Mr. Mnangagwa has won strong support from senior military and intelligence officers for an aggressive policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. His key ally is a Commander of ZDF and Executive Chairman of COSLEG, General Vitalis Musunga Gava Zvinavashe. The General and his family have been involved in diamond trading and supply contracts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A long-time ally of President Mugabe, Air Marshal Perence Shiri, has been involved in military procurement and organizing air support for the pro-Kinshasa armed groups fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is also part of the inner circle of ZDF diamond traders who have turned Harare into a significant illicit diamond-trading centre.

28. Other prominent Zimbabwean members of the network include Brigadier General Sibusiso Busi Moyo, who is Director General of COSLEG. Brigadier Moyo advised both Tremalt and Oryx Natural Resources, which represented covert Zimbabwean military financial interests in negotiations with State mining companies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Air Commodore Mike Tichafa Karakadzai is Deputy Secretary of COSLEG, directing policy and procurement. He played a key role in arranging the Tremalt cobalt and copper deal. Colonel Simpson Sikhulile Nyathi is Director of defence policy for COSLEG. The Minister of Defence and former Security Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, coordinates with the military leadership and is a shareholder in COSLEG. The Panel has a copy of a letter from Mr. Sekeramayi thanking the Chief Executive of Oryx Natural Resources, Thamer Bin Said Ahmed Al-Shanfari, for his material and moral support during the parliamentary elections of 2000. Such contributions violate Zimbabwean law.

29. In June 2002, the Panel learned of a secret new ZDF diamond mining operation in Kalobo in Kasai Occidental run by Dube Associates. This company is linked, according to banking documents, through Colonel Tshinga Dube of Zimbabwe Defence Industries to the Ukrainian diamond and arms dealer Leonid Minim, who currently faces smuggling charges in Italy. The diamond mining operations have been conducted in great secrecy.

30. Among the businessmen in the elite network, a Belgian national, George Forrest, pioneered the exploitative joint venture agreements between private companies and Gécamines. Mr. Forrest owes his commercial ascendancy to his long-standing ties to the establishment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One of his companies also makes and markets military equipment. Since 1994, he has owned 100 per cent of New Lachaussée in Belgium, which is a leading manufacturer of cartridge casings, grenades, light weapons and cannon launchers. In a flagrant conflict of interest, Mr. Forrest was appointed Chairman of Gécamines from November 1999 to August 2001 while his private companies negotiated new contracts with the explicit intention of using Gécamines’ assets for personal gain. During that time he built up the most wide-ranging private mining portfolio in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He benefits from strong backing from some political quarters in Belgium where some of his companies are based. His operations have been strongly criticized (one Belgian diplomatic cable referred to Mr. Forrest running a “strategy of attrition” in the mining sector of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and have recently come under the scrutiny of the Belgian Senate’s investigation into resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

31. The techniques used by Mr. Forrest have since been replicated by Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs John Arnold Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari. Mr. Bredenkamp, who has an estimated personal net worth of over $500 million, is experienced in setting up clandestine companies and sanctions-busting operations. Mr. Al-Shanfari has gained privileged access to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its diamond concessions in exchange for raising capital from some powerful entrepreneurs in the Gulf such as Issa al-Kawari who manages the fortune of the deposed Amir of Qatar. Also working with ZDF is a convicted criminal based in South Africa, Nico Shefer, who has arranged for Zimbabwean officers to be trained in diamond valuation in Johannesburg. Mr. Shefer’s company, Tandan Holdings, has a 50 per cent stake in Thorntree Industries, a joint venture diamond-trading company with ZDF.

32. Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach headed a joint venture cobalt-mining company and was Chief Executive of Gécamines from November 1998 to March 2000. Although stripped of his cobalt concessions in Katanga, Mr. Rautenbach told the Panel that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had offered his company, Ridgepointe International, mining rights to Gécamines concessions at Shinkolobwe, which include substantial deposits of uranium, copper and cobalt. Mr. Rautenbach’s representatives said that any new agreement would be subject to the new mining code of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and any uranium mining operations would be open to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

33. Such high levels of mineral exploitation would be impossible without the collusion of highly placed government officials who provide mining licences and export permits in return for private gain. The Panel has compiled extensive documentation of such facilitations. For example, in its attempts to buy rights to the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals (FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust for Government officials. According to documents in the possession of the Panel, the payments list included the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its share price once it was announced that it had secured some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

34. The Panel has documents showing that three “clans” of Lebanese origin, who operate licensed diamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamonds from the Democratic Republic of the Congo worth $150 million in 2001, either directly through Kinshasa or through comptoirs in the Republic of the Congo. The three “clans” — Ahmad, Nassour and Khanafer — are distinct criminal organizations that operate internationally. Their activities, known to intelligence services and police organizations, include counterfeiting, money-laundering and diamond smuggling. Several credible sources have reported that the clans also have ties with Amal and Hezbollah. Some businesses associated with the clans are Sierra Gem Diamonds, Asa Diam, Triple A Diamonds and Echogem. A group linked to the clans operations is providing counterfeit United States dollars to former generals from the time of President Mobutu, who are trying to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Strategies and sources of revenue

35. The Panel has identified five strategies for generating revenues for the elite network through diamond, copper and cobalt mining companies. The network coordinates its operations between its political, military and business wings to generate maximum income.

Asset stripping of State mining companies

36. The richest and most readily exploitable of the publicly owned mineral assets of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are being moved into joint ventures that are controlled by the network’s private companies. These transactions, which are controlled through secret contracts and off-shore private companies, amount to a multi-billion-dollar corporate theft of the country’s mineral assets. Some 30 businessmen, politicians and military officers are the main beneficiaries of the arrangements. The elite network has been trying to legitimize such corporate theft and market these assets to legitimate international mining companies.

37. The Panel has now obtained documentary evidence that Mr. Al-Shanfari’s company, Oryx Natural Resources, is being used as a front for ZDF and its military company OSLEG. Sengamines claims an 800 square kilometre concession, just south of Mbuji Mayi, carved out of the concession of the Société Minière de Bakwanga. According to company officials, Sengamines’ diamond concessions would be worth at least $2 billion if they were put into full production.

38. Sengamines claimed that it had reconfigured its equity after a failed attempt to be listed on the London Stock Exchange in June 2000, as follows: 49 per cent for Oryx Natural Resources, 35 per cent for COMIEXCongo, and 16 per cent for MIBA. The Panel has learned that this purported buyout never happened. It was a device to disguise the close association between Sengamines and ZDF, and to deceive international investors. ZDF, through OSLEG, owns the 49 per cent of Sengamines that is publicly claimed by Oryx. In the course of a meeting held on 1 August 2000, OSLEG nominated Oryx to hold its 49 per cent interest in Sengamines; 35 per cent is held by COMIEX-Congo, and 16 per cent has been allocated to MIBA.

39. Tremalt Ltd., represented by Mr. Bredenkamp, holds the rights to exploit six Gécamines concessions containing over 2.7 million tons of copper and 325,000 tons of cobalt over 25 years. Tremalt paid the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo just $400,000, but the estimated worth of the six concessions exceeds $1 billion. The joint venture running the concession is the Kababankola Mining Company, in which Tremalt has an 80 per cent share to Gécamines’ 20 per cent. Under this agreement, the Panel has learned that Gécamines derives no direct financial benefit. Although Tremalt representatives told the Panel that they have invested $15 million to date, there are no signs of substantial investments having been made on the concessions, nor has any schedule of investment in the form of a business plan been released to Gécamines.

40. Like Oryx, Tremalt insists that its operations are not linked to ZDF or the Government of Zimbabwe. However, the Panel has obtained a copy of the confidential profit-sharing agreement, under which Tremalt retains 32 per cent of net profits, and undertakes to pay 34 per cent of net profits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 34 per cent to Zimbabwe. This profit-sharing agreement was the subject of a confidential memorandum from the Defence Minister, Mr. Sekeramayi, to President Mugabe in August 2002. Tremalt also undertakes to provide the Congolese and Zimbabwean militaries with motor vehicles, trucks, buses and cash payments as necessary. These are to be subtracted from the two countries’ part of the profit share. A forum has been established between Tremalt and ZDF to plan strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and “look after the interests of the Zimbabweans”. Meeting monthly, the forum’s main members are General Zvinavashe, Brigadier Moyo, Air Commodore Karakadzai, Mr. Bredenkamp, the Managing Director of KMC, Colin Blythe-Wood, and the Director of KMC, Gary Webster.

41. Gécamines officials told the Panel that the National Security Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo had pressured their negotiators to agree to the joint venture contract despite its negative implications for the State company’s finances. The ultimate owners and beneficiaries of Tremalt are hidden behind a web of trusts and private holding companies registered in the British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man to whose records the Panel was not allowed direct access. 

Control of procurement and accounting

42. Management control is essential to the elite network’s strategy for extracting maximum revenue from the joint ventures. Much of the revenue from the joint ventures is off the balance sheet in overpriced subcontracting and procurement arrangements with companies and individuals linked to the network. The two biggest Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the Congo joint ventures — Sengamines and KMC — are declaring huge losses.

Enterprise General Malta Forrest and Groupe George Forrest

43. Groupe George Forrest (GGF) in partnership with the United States-based OM Group currently runs one of the most profitable mining operations from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with only the most marginal benefit for the State mining company, Gécamines. Through this venture, the Scories du Terril de Lubumbashi (STL), also known as the Big Hill Project, Mr. Forrest and OM Group have secured access to a copper and cobalt stockpile which contains over 3,000 tons of germanium, a rare metal used in optical fibres, infrared lenses and telecommunication satellites. This stockpile, formerly the property of Gécamines, has a current market value of more than $2 billion. Although the shareholdings for the STL project are divided between OM Group (55 per cent), GGF (25 per cent) and Gécamines (20 per cent), the State company has been expressly excluded from the revenues derived from the germanium processing.

44. Gécamines officials complain that OM Group and GGF have deliberately ignored the agreed technical plan for the STL project, which provided for two electric-powered refineries and a converter to be built adjacent to the copper and cobalt stockpile. This would have meant that all the germanium would have been processed within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gécamines would have been entitled to a revenue share. Instead the semi-processed ore is shipped to OM Group’s plant in Finland where the germanium is extracted. The former Chairman of Gécamines, Mr. Forrest, whose construction companies built the STL project, has declined to intervene on behalf of the State company. Gécamines has rejected an offer by OM Group to cede the State company just 5 per cent of the revenues from the germanium processing in Finland.

45. Mr. Forrest has used his position in the elite network in an attempt to control the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to several reliable sources. For example, the Kinross Gold Corporation of Canada had sought to invest up to $1 billion in copper and cobalt mining operations, but was thwarted by interventions from Mr. Forrest and senior Government officials. The company returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2001 as part of Kinross-Forrest Ltd., a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. A smaller Belgian-based company, Madsa, obtained the support of the World Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization for a $20 million development package to build processing plants to service the mining sector: a smelter, an acid manufacturing plant and a cement factory. Mr. Forrest and his business allies have opposed this development, in part, it seems, because it would cut their profits from the current overpriced procurement contracts.

Tremalt Ltd. (John Bredenkamp)

46. Tremalt’s 80 per cent stake in KMC gives it management control over day-to-day administration and longer-term strategic decisions about exploiting the concession. Tremalt also procures equipment for ZDF and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the cost of which it deducts from their share of KMC profits. Although Ridgepointe International, run by Mr. Rautenbach, the previous foreign investor in the Kababankola concessions, had to operate with much more dilapidated processing plants, it generated more than $20 million profit within 18 months of taking over. Industry analysts say that Tremalt’s claimed losses of more than $13 million from February 2001 to July 2002 are not credible.

Organized theft

47. FAC and ZDF officers who controlled security at the main joint venture sites have been involved in and facilitate high levels of theft from production. Reliable sources have informed the Panel that managers in several companies, with support from the members of the elite network, collude in these thefts.

48. The State-owned Société minière de Bakwanga diamond company has been plundered by a management that condones widespread theft by company insiders. Three theft rings operate in the MIBA compound known as the polygone. The first of these rings was organized and operated by 48 Zimbabwean soldiers who had been stationed at five different locations throughout the large mining site. Zimbabwe military personnel allow groups of people to enter the polygone and dig for diamonds, and in exchange receive compensation in the form of money and diamonds.

49. A second theft ring is operated by the Brigade Minière or provincial mining police, who are trained to guard the mine. Previously sacked for theft, Brigade Minière Commander Mushitu has returned to the force. In exchange for protection, the Commander receives sacks of diamond-rich gravel. However, the diamond diggers are often caught in exchanges of fire between the Brigade Minière and the Zimbabweans in their efforts to control the diamond thefts.

50. These losses are probably modest compared to the losses from a third theft ring that involves highlevel MIBA managers and occurs inside the cleaning, sorting and classification operation facility. The thefts include gem and near-gem production. About 50 per cent of all company revenues are generated by the 3 to 4 per cent of gem and near-gem production. The drop in revenues resulting from theft has been estimated at about 25 per cent of total revenue, roughly 25 million dollars per annum. Under pressure from its creditors, MIBA was obliged to engage the services of a private security firm, Overseas Security Services, which determined that a criminal syndicate was operating inside the classification operation.

Using the corporate facade as a cover for criminal activities

51. Some members of the elite network running joint ventures are linked to the smuggling of precious metals and gems, arms trafficking, illegal foreign exchange trading and money-laundering. The Panel has received extensive documentation and first-hand testimony explaining the mechanics of these criminal operations.

52. Sengamines supplements its revenues by laundering diamonds smuggled from Angola and Sierra Leone. Sengamines also smuggles its own diamonds out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Panel has learned of specific instances, times, places and persons involved. For example, in March 2001, Mr. Al-Shanfari instructed his security chief to smuggle diamonds from the Sengamines concession to Johannesburg, South Africa, and deliver them to Ken Roberts, the chief executive of Serengeti Diamonds.

53. Sengamines has also served as a front for illegal foreign exchange transactions using several routes into and out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most of the latter involved breaking the country’s foreign exchange laws and profiting from arbitrage between differential exchange rates for the United States dollar and Congolese franc in Kinshasa and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. In one example, on 13 March 2000, Oryx officials in Kinshasa loaded an aircraft belonging to Mr. Bredenkamp with eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to Harare. The Panel also has documentation substantiating information that an Oryx employee regularly transported parcels of United States dollars ($500,000 at a time) that were withdrawn from the Oryx account at Hambros Bank, London, to Kinshasa without declaring them to the Congolese authorities; at Kinshasa the money was changed into Congolese francs and further transported to Harare and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Oryx employees said they were asked to pay Mr. Mnangagwa a commission on these transactions which contravened Zimbabwe law. Despite repeated claims by Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives that he has no business relationship with Mr. Al-Shanfari, the Panel has received a document — dated January 2001 and jointly signed by Mr. Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari — guaranteeing a $1.5 million loan to Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd. 

Mining revenues and the military

54. The procurement of military equipment and services is a major source of revenue for the elite network. Several joint venture mining companies have strong links with the military supply companies who facilitate their operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has information that diamond revenues were used to pay for arms purchases for FAC and indirectly used to finance the contribution of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to salary payments for ZDF. It has received a document recording a transfer of MIBA funds requested by Brigadier General François Olenga for the purchase of weapons for FAC.

55. Oryx Natural Resources has a close working relationship with Avient Air, a military company which supplies services and equipment to ZDF and FAC. In April 2002, Avient Air brokered the sale of six attack helicopters to the Kinshasa Government. Bank records show several transactions between Avient and accused trafficker Leonid Minim. Under the management of Andrew Smith, a former British army captain, Gerry O’Brien and Lewis Kling, Avient was contracted to organize bombing raids into the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999 and 2000. At the same time Avient organized logistics and transportation of mining equipment for Sengamines and enjoyed security clearance as a military company working with ZDF. The Panel has a record of a payment in September 2001 of $35,000 from the Oryx account at Banque Belgolaise to Avient Ltd., Avient Air’s sister company based in the United Kingdom.

56. John Bredenkamp, who has a history of clandestine military procurement, has an investment in Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS). The Panel has confirmed, independently of Mr. Bredenkamp, that this company represents British Aerospace, Dornier of France and Agusta of Italy in Africa. Far from being a passive investor in ACS as Tremalt representatives claimed, Mr. Bredenkamp actively seeks business using high-level political contacts. In discussions with senior officials he has offered to mediate sales of British Aerospace military equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives claimed that his companies observed European Union sanctions on Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for ZDF Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 in breach of those sanctions. Mr. Bredenkamp also controls Raceview Enterprises, which supplies logistics to ZDF. The Panel has obtained copies of Raceview invoices to ZDF dated 6 July 2001 for deliveries worth $3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and lubricating oil, boots and rations. It also has copies of invoices for aircraft spares for the Air Force of Zimbabwe worth another $3 million.

Case study of a commercial chain involving diamonds

57. The Democratic Republic of the Congo-Zimbabwe joint venture Minerals Business Company represents Zimbabwe’s interests in the lucrative diamond trade of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It buys and markets production from the joint venture Sengamines, which has attempted to conceal its links with ZDF. The Minerals Business Company uses Zimbabwe’s military and political influence to evade the legal requirements of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to avoid paying the costly licensing fees. The refusal of MBC to honour its obligations to the public treasury has prompted official complaints from the Ministry of Mines demanding that MBC comply with the law. MBC officials have asserted that Zimbabwean entities are not obliged to adhere to the laws of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

58. The Minerals Business Company allows a limited number of other diamond companies to take advantage of the privileged status it enjoys in Kinshasa. Sandrian Mining, based in Kinshasa, has a contractual relationship with MBC. Thorntree Industries, a joint venture between South Africa-based Nico Shefer’s Tandan group and ZDF, also has contracts with MBC, as does Mixen Trading, which has offices in Zimbabwe. MBC sells to the United States-based Flashes of Color, and the Swiss-registered Ibryn & Associates, as well as to the Belgian-registered Jewel Impex, Komal Gems and Diagem. One of the most important trading partners of MBC is the Belgianbased company Abadiam, which buys from MBC as well as directly from Sengamines. The Panel has bank records dated September 2001 showing transfers of more than $1 million from the Belgian account of Oryx Natural Resources to Abadiam.

Collapse of the public sector; armed conflict and its humanitarian consequences

Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental

59. The diversion of funds from State companies and public coffers, by fraud or under the pretext of effort de guerre, has contributed to eliminating funds available for public services. The public sector in the two Kasai Provinces has effectively disappeared. Of the five water production plants in Kasai Oriental, four plants no longer function and the fifth, in the city of Mbuji Mayi, is said to function at less than 20 per cent capacity. Of the six water production plants in Kasai Occidental, five no longer function; the sixth, in the city of Kananga, operates at best at 10 per cent capacity.

60. Government officials blame the precipitous decline in public spending on the war. Most soldiers are unpaid and become social predators, financing themselves through theft and pillage, living off the population they are presumed to protect, and provincial governments make little effort to discourage them. Taxes and licensing fees have nevertheless increased, as have the forced acquisition of the resources of State enterprises in the name of the war effort. The Government has therefore benefited from the state of war by using it as a pretext, not only to justify an increase in demands on the population to increase government revenues, but also to justify a decrease in expenditure. Insecurity in the Government-controlled area is only a small part of the consequences of support for the military in war. It is much more a consequence of the deliberate neglect of the military, who by virtue of this neglect turn their weapons on the population.

61. The pretext of war, increased government levies, unpaid salaries and the absence of government services have combined to precipitate a collapse in the urban economies of Mbuji Mayi, Kananga and, to a lesser extent, of Lubumbashi. Banks no longer offer credit in the Kasai Provinces. The absence of local credit and the decline of road transport have forced most local industries in Kananga to close.

Katanga

62. Lubumbashi, and southern Katanga generally, have been affected by Rwanda’s presence in the north. The occupation by RPA of the northern portion of Katanga, the rich agricultural plains around Nyunzu and Kongolo, has cut the southern portion off from what was once the breadbasket of Katanga.

63. A recent study by Médecins sans Frontières in Kilwa, a representative town in southern Katanga south of the front line, with a population of 350,000, has found a death rate for children under 5 of 3.2 per 10,000 per day. Over the course of a year this means that 12 per cent of all children under 5 years old will die, and one out of every four children die over a period of two years. Notably, virtually none (0.6 per cent) of the deaths resulted from violence. Deaths instead result from illness — malaria and dysentery: conditions closely linked to malnutrition and the absence of medical facilities.

64. Malaria and dysentery are treatable. International non-governmental organizations — World Vision and Médecins sans Frontières in this case — try to step in where government facilities no longer function. However, the soaring death rates in the Governmentheld areas around Ankoro, Kilwa, Dubie and Lwanza, especially where medical facilities are non-existent and where State medical professionals receive no salaries, are indications of Government negligence. The rates of malnutrition and mortality are measures of that negligence and are the consequence, in part, of diverting State resources from State companies such as Gécamines into the private accounts of Zimbabwean individuals, other private interests, and Congolese individuals.

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