6. Prior to its departure, on 31 May 1995, the mission held
successive meetings with the Permanent Representatives of Morocco,
Algeria and Mauritania to the United Nations and with the
representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York, in order to
elicit their views on the mission’s terms of reference. It also
asked them to facilitate contacts with the parties and observers
with whom the mission would hold meetings and discussions.
7. The mission left New York on 3 June and visited Morocco,
Algeria and Mauritania where it held meetings with senior government
officials of those countries, including an audience with Mr. Maaoya
Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, President of Mauritania. In addition, the
mission visited Tindouf, where it met with the leadership of the
Frente POLISARIO. In Tindouf, the mission also held a briefing
session with officials of MINURSO and some of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) observers currently there and witnessed the
identification operation in two centres. The mission then went to
Laayoune, where it attended a meeting with local Moroccan government
officials, was briefed by the MINURSO Force Commander and Civilian
Police Commissioner and met with the remaining OAU observers and
some MINURSO staff. While in Laayoune, the mission also witnessed
the identification operation (see annex I for a full schedule of the
mission’s activities).
A. Briefing by the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Western Sahara
8. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
Mr. Erik Jensen, joined the mission in Rabat and remained with it
throughout the period it stayed in the region. During his briefing,
Mr. Jensen explained the position of the two parties vis-à-vis
the settlement plan and, in particular, the holding of the
referendum. After the adoption by the Security Council of resolution
907 (1994) of 29 March 1994, approving option B of the report of the
Secretary-General (S/1994/283/Add.1) of 21 March 1994 and calling
upon the Identification Commission to proceed with its work on the
basis of the Secretary-General’s compromise proposal, both parties
agreed to move forward with the identification process. Mr. Jensen
alerted the mission that the Frente POLISARIO believed that the
settlement plan was weighted against it and was concerned about
certain developments in the identification process.
9. When asked about the guidelines on which the Identification
Commission based its procedures, Mr. Jensen informed the mission of
the following: in the event that an applicant was not included in
the Spanish census, did not present any documentation confirming
his/her identity and substantiating his/her claim for admission
under one of the remaining criteria, and if the two sheikhs who were
called upon to provide the relevant oral testimony disagreed, the
burden of proof would rest with the respective applicant to offer
convincing evidence to the Identification Commission that he/she
qualified for inclusion in the electoral roll.
10. Mr. Jensen informed the mission that although both parties
stressed their commitment to the process and their desire to see it
through under the settlement plan, in practice they had difficulty
from time to time in cooperating fully with all aspects of the
process thus often causing interruptions in the identification. Even
after agreeing to the Deputy Special Representative’s formula for
solving the problem of the non-timely availability of sheikhs to
provide oral testimony, the two parties still had some difficulty in
always providing and accepting each other’s alternates to replace
the absent sheikhs, thus causing further interruptions in the
identification operation.
11. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
further briefed the mission on the status of the work on the
implementation of other aspects of the settlement plan. He expressed
the hope that after the mission’s visit the recurring problems in
the identification could be resolved, allowing him time to
concentrate on the implementation of the other aspects of the
settlement plan.
B. Meetings with officials of the Government of
Morocco
12. In Rabat, the mission first met with Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Abdellatif Filali and officials of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Filali reiterated Morocco’s
desire to resolve all problems before the end of the year and hold
the referendum in January 1996 as provided for in the settlement
plan. Mr. Filali stressed that the presence of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Territory had become
essential as D-Day approached.
13. Mr. Filali emphasized that MINURSO needed four essential
conditions to be met for the implementation of the settlement plan:
(a) permanent support by the Security Council; (b) full cooperation
by the two parties; (c) assurances of cooperation and support by the
neighbouring countries; and (d) availability of the necessary
financial resources. In that context, he observed that while Morocco
accepted the criteria for identification, the other party recognized
them formally but, he believed, had instructed their sheikhs to
accept only three of them in the identification process. This, he
stressed, constituted a serious obstacle to the process.
14. When requested by the mission whether Morocco could increase
its contribution to the financing of MINURSO, he agreed to consider
the request, but he needed specific details through a formal request
to Morocco’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York.
Mr. Filali finally stressed that MINURSO’s withdrawal prior to the
fulfilment of its mandate could be dangerous for the region as it
would be a factor of instability.
15. The mission then met with Mr. Driss Basri, Minister of State
for the Interior and officials of the Ministry of the Interior. Mr.
Basri and his colleagues pointed out that scheduling adjustments to
the original timetable, brought about as a result of the cease-fire,
impeded progress and resulted in an extra financial burden for the
MINURSO operation. Mr. Basri pointed out that, until May 1995, the
Government of Morocco had contributed $25 million to cover the
accommodation and food of MINURSO staff. In addition, $632,000
covering value added tax had been returned to MINURSO as well as
$179,000 covering landing rights.
16. Mr. Basri further reminded the mission of Morocco’s view
that the 100,000 applicants currently not residing in the Territory
would have to be identified. Those applications were not presented
in computerized form along with the material relevant to persons
living in the territory and therefore were not taken into account in
MINURSO’s timetable for completing the identification process.
With respect to such numbers, Mr. Basri put forward his Government’s
offer to provide the logistical and technical support for the
identification of those applicants either by transferring them to
the Territory or by transporting the Identification Commission to
them with the aim of identifying 30,000 to 50,000 persons per month.
To that effect, he requested the opening of more identification
centres.
17. According to Mr. Basri, the Spanish census did not take into
account the structure of the Saharan society, hence Morocco’s
position that additional criteria were needed for the identification
of potential voters. He pointed out that, in Morocco’s view,
criterion 4 was equal in value to others and that applicants under
this criterion should not be systematically rejected. He stressed to
the mission that all applicants who might not be registered would
have a right to appeal.
18. With regard to the reduction of Moroccan troops to 65,000,
Mr. Basri reiterated that Morocco had appointed those who would be
responsible for dealing with the matter. The mission was informed
that Morocco would cooperate with the military component of MINURSO
once D-Day had been determined. In the Moroccan Government’s view,
the confinement of the POLISARIO troops should take place in
Algeria. Mr. Basri further confirmed to the mission that the matter
of the release of political detainees had been discussed with the
independent jurist during his recent visit and that Morocco intended
to continue its cooperation with him. He also stressed that once the
identification process was completed, Morocco would be ready to
accept repatriated refugees, ensuring their honour, security and
freedom and providing housing, schooling and whatever else would be
necessary for their rehabilitation.
19. At Laayoune, the mission attended a meeting at the Palais de
Congrès, where local government officials, several sheikhs and
representatives of the Saharans made various presentations. All the
speakers pledged their allegiance to His Majesty King Hassan II of
Morocco. They also pledged their support to MINURSO and underlined
their determination to see the process come to a successful end to
enable Morocco to put the finishing touches to its territorial
integrity. They all stressed that the slowness of the identification
process was due to obstacles created by the other party, who wanted
to impede the work of the Commission. The speakers also reiterated
the promise made by the Minister of the Interior to accelerate the
pace of identification in order to reach 30,000 to 50,000 applicants
per month.
C. Meetings with officials of the Frente
POLISARIO
20. Upon its arrival at Tindouf on 6 June 1995 and after meeting
with MINURSO Identification Commission staff, the mission met with
the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO, including Mr. Mohamed
Abdelaziz, its Secretary-General, Mr. Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Deputy
Secretary-General and coordinator with MINURSO, and other senior
Frente POLISARIO officials. In the Smara refugee camp, the mission
met with representatives of the sheikhs.
21. Mr. Abdelaziz reiterated the Frente POLISARIO’S willingness
and determination to see a free and fair referendum as a lasting
solution to the problem of Western Sahara. He stated that, as a sign
of goodwill, the Frente POLISARIO had made many concessions in order
to allow for the settlement plan to proceed. It later found out that
more concessions were expected in order to make implementation of
the plan possible.
22. Mr. Sayed stressed that, in the Frente POLISARIO’S view,
the list of voters should be based on the 1974 census, with a small
margin of increase to allow for population growth. He informed the
mission that the Frente POLISARIO had expressed serious reservations
about the implementation of criteria 4 and 5 and about the admission
of oral testimony by the sheikhs and had asked for guarantees that
their concerns would be addressed by the United Nations. However,
the Frente POLISARIO felt very concerned about the manner in which
the identification operation was being conducted and about MINURSO’s
ability to ensure fairness in the process. According to Mr. Sayed,
so far in the identification, the two sheikhs appeared to disagree
in 60 per cent of the cases; there had not been one single agreement
among the party teams observing the process in the identification
centres.
23. He stressed that the Frente POLISARIO had accepted the
cease-fire in order to achieve self-determination through peaceful
means. In its view, alterations made later to the settlement plan
had led to one party controlling the process. He reiterated that the
Frente POLISARIO expected fair implementation of the settlement plan
as agreed upon by both parties and as adopted by the Security
Council.
24. Mr. Sayed spoke about the difficulty the POLISARIO sheikhs
had in being called to testify in the identification of persons,
only 20 per cent of whom had been included in the Spanish census and
80 per cent of whom were said to be without adequate documentation.
It would not be easy for the POLISARIO to convince the sheikhs to
continue participating in a process characterized by lack of
transparency.
25. The difficulty the sheikhs had with the process was later
reiterated to the mission by the sheikhs themselves when they
addressed the mission at a meeting that took place at the Smara
refugee camp. All the speakers rejected the present occupation of
the Territory by Morocco and attributed delays in the identification
process to obstacles created by the other party. Some of the sheikhs
pointed out that in 75 per cent of the cases they had disagreed over
an applicant’s identification; also that some of their colleagues
on the Moroccan side had expressed fear about testifying freely. The
sheikhs proposed that, in order to expedite and make the
identification process more credible, the sub-fraction leaders
should decide in advance about the persons who belonged in their
sub-fraction and then provide the list to the Identification
Commission.
26. With regard to the confinement of its troops, the Frente
POLISARIO reiterated that they should be confined in the area
between the sand-wall (berm) and the international border.
When it came to the withdrawal of Moroccan troops, the Frente
POLISARIO expressed doubts about MINURSO’s ability to monitor the
Moroccan withdrawal and to neutralize the Moroccan paramilitary
forces as called for in the settlement plan.
27. For the Frente POLISARIO, the question of the repatriation of
refugees was more than a humanitarian problem; it was also a
political issue as the United Nations would have to convince the
refugees that it would be safe to return to their land. On the same
subject, POLISARIO expressed disappointment that neither the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) nor the
Security Council had intervened at the time that Morocco transferred
thousands of people to the Territory, in violation of the settlement
plan.
28. The Frente POLISARIO did not wish MINURSO’s withdrawal
prior to the completion of its mandate. It strongly supported the
holding of a fair and transparent referendum, asking for guarantees
to that effect from the Security Council. At the same time, the
mission observed the POLISARIO leadership’s increasing doubts
about MINURSO’s ability to ensure fairness in the process, doubts
that some observers believe could place the settlement plan at risk.
The mission argued, in the strongest terms possible, that the
interests of the POLISARIO were best protected by staying with the
plan, that the plan was the only possible solution and that there
was no credible alternative to it.
D. Discussions with officials of the Government
of Algeria
29. In the afternoon of 5 June 1995, the mission travelled to
Algiers, where it met with Mr. Mohammed Salah Dembri, Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and other officials of the Foreign
Ministry. Mr. Dembri argued for a political solution without victors
or vanquished. He said that, in Algeria’s view, Western Sahara was
a typical case of decolonization. Inclusion of additional criteria
had diverted the settlement plan from its original objective,
leading to quantitative mechanisms that could not be mastered.
Moreover, further attempts had been made to erode and weaken the
settlement plan.
30. On the matter of the confinement of the POLISARIO troops, the
Government of Algeria strongly rejected the proposal made in 1991 by
the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General that they
be confined in Algeria. In the Government’s view, this would
extend the theatre of conflict to Algerian territory. Algeria
expressed the view that the cantonment of POLISARIO troops should be
part of a consultation process, as defined by the initial United
Nations and OAU resolutions, outside any military and administrative
constraints. Algerian government officials further pointed out that
the settlement plan stipulated placing the Moroccan forces along the
berm, which is not part of the international border. In
Algeria’s view, the troops of both parties should be confined in
an equitable manner within the Territory. Similarly, the return of
refugees and the exchange of prisoners of war should be addressed by
the parties in a bilateral manner.
31. Mr. Dembri stressed that for any solid progress to be made,
there should be consultation between the two parties as the United
Nations cannot replace them. He reiterated Algeria’s commitment to
peace, security and stability in the region and its intention to
continue helping the two parties to reach compromise through
dialogue on other aspects and emphasized that the two parties must
have a vision of the post-referendum period.
E. Meetings with officials of the Government of
Mauritania
32. On 7 June 1995, the mission visited Mauritania, where it met
with Mr. Maaoya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, President, and Mr. Mohamed
Ould Boubakar, Prime Minister, in the presence of Mr. Mohamed Salem
Ould Lekhal, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other Foreign
Ministry officials. The President of Mauritania informed the mission
that the settlement of the Western Sahara issue was of great
importance to Mauritania, owing in part to the long border it shared
with the Territory.
33. Authorities in Nouakchott follow developments of this issue
very closely, which is of the utmost importance to the security of
the subregion. Mauritania has already had difficulties in the past
because of the existence of the conflict in Western Sahara. In
Mauritania’s view, the United Nations should persevere and be more
forceful in trying to achieve a solution. A premature withdrawal of
MINURSO would be catastrophic for the subregion. Mauritania offered
to put its limited resources at the disposal of the United Nations
in an effort to find a peaceful solution. The President agreed to
enable MINURSO to proceed as soon as possible with the
identification of applicants living in Mauritania.
F. Meeting with observers of the Organization
of African Unity
34. In both Tindouf and Laayoune, the mission met with the OAU
observers assisting the Identification Commission in its work. Some
of the OAU observers saw many problems in the manner in which the
identification operation was being conducted, causing MINURSO to
have almost lost control of it. In their view, the Council should
entrust MINURSO to take over the identification operation
completely. Others acknowledged that the problems were not
insurmountable and that MINURSO had come a long way in the search
for peace.
35. The OAU observers cautioned that it would not be easy to
proceed with the other aspects of the settlement plan and that there
were no guarantees that innovative ways to resolve them would
succeed. Although a January deadline for the referendum might not be
realistic, it would be unthinkable to talk about MINURSO’s
withdrawal at the present stage. The observers also cautioned that
the African continent would find it difficult to understand the
reasons behind MINURSO’s withdrawal.
36. All OAU observers urged the Security Council to be more
forceful on the question of cooperation by the parties and to elicit
their consent to abide with their agreement with MINURSO; the
Council should also entrust MINURSO to take over the identification
operation completely.
G. Briefing by the Force Commander and the
Civilian Police Commissioner
37. In Laayoune, the mission was briefed by the MINURSO Force
Commander, Brigadier-General Andre Van Baelen, and the Civilian
Police Commissioner, Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe. The Force Commander
highlighted the difficulties faced by MINURSO’s military component
in its operational capabilities as a result of administrative
problems and financial limitations placed on the mission. Those
problems and limitations had caused critical logistical
deficiencies. He stressed that, to a large extent, the success of
the cease-fire had been due to MINURSO’s ability to monitor it
regularly. He expressed concern that if MINURSO’s military
presence in the field were to be reduced because of the
above-mentioned constraints, the two parties might lose their
confidence in it.
38. The Civilian Police Commissioner explained to the mission the
role of the civilian police in the identification operation. He also
highlighted some of the tasks that the civilian police would be
expected to undertake once MINURSO went into full expansion.
39. In its discussions with the two parties the mission observed
that there was continuing suspicion and lack of trust. As a result,
in the course of identification, technical problems that could have
been resolved easily had there been goodwill, had become politicized
and blown out of proportion, with each party blaming the other for
the lack of progress. This could make it nearly impossible for
MINURSO to meet its objectives unless both parties improved their
performance. The parties’ cooperation must be combined with the
necessary resources being made available to MINURSO, if there is to
be any realistic hope of maintaining the timetable.
40. Given the complexity of the tasks to be performed, the
continuing delays caused by the two parties and the constraints
imposed by limited resources and local conditions, the mission is
concerned that the time necessary to perform the functions
associated with the identification process and other aspects of the
settlement plan has been underestimated. The mission therefore feels
that there is a real risk that the identification process may be
extended beyond the time previously envisaged and the referendum may
not be held in January 1996.
41. In the course of the mission’s discussions with the two
parties, while trying to elicit their commitment to abandon their
insistence on reciprocity in the number and operation of
identification centres on each side, each party insisted that its
performance be conditional on the performance of the other. The
mission strongly recommends that both parties abandon their
insistence on reciprocity in the number and operation of
identification centres on each side and refrain from their habit of
blaming their lack of cooperation on the other side.
42. With regard to mobile identification teams, it was explained
to the mission that it was hardly realistic to move around the
desert the generators, computers and other equipment necessary for
the identification, in addition to the teams of party and OAU
observers, rotating sheikhs and MINURSO personnel. While moving
through the desert, all these people would have to be supplied with
food, water and accommodation. The Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General therefore suggested, and the mission agreed
with him, that additional identification teams be mobilized instead,
in temporary fixed centres.
43. There should be no limit to the number of persons to be
identified on any given day. Moreover, other practices aimed at
ensuring a faster pace of the identification process should be
strongly encouraged. The mission urges that the highest possible
number of identifications per day, as many as a full working day
allows, be permitted to take place.
44. A key element of the identification process is the work of
the legal review office. The substantive review of the undecided
cases has recently commenced. Unless this is expedited, the time
needed to review those cases will further delay the date of the
referendum. The mission recommends that MINURSO speed up the
substantive review of the identification case files and the
compiling of preliminary voter eligibility lists.
45. In that respect, the mission further recommends measures that
will ensure full confidentiality in dealing with the review cases.
MINURSO should maximize security arrangements with respect to
information about the identification.
46. The mission calls upon the Government of Morocco to conduct
preliminary vetting of the 100,000 applicants currently not residing
in the Territory prior to examination by the Identification
Commission, in order to enable MINURSO to maintain its timetable for
completing the identification process.
47. MINURSO should without delay commence the identification
operation for applicants living in Mauritania, in cooperation with
the Government of Mauritania, with a view to completing that
operation as soon as possible.
48. Reports on the progress of identification should be made to
the Security Council every two weeks. Should the identification
operation be interrupted or slowed down for any reason, this should
be reported immediately to the Council.
49. The mission calls upon the two parties not to inhibit access
to the identification centres and to take all necessary steps in
order to facilitate a free and fair process on the basis of the
guidelines outlined by the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in paragraph 9 above.
50. The mission recommends speeding up the administrative
decision-making process to enable MINURSO to have all the human and
other resources that could be required to expedite its work.
51. It is important that communiqués issued by MINURSO be
transmitted over the radio by both parties, as requested by the
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
52. Given the prevailing conditions following the cease-fire, the
original timetable for the identification was delinked from D-Day.
The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in
consultation with the two parties and the observer countries, should
seek ways to secure a date in the near future for the reduction and
confinement of troops in order to allow the Secretary-General to
make his ruling in the matter in early September. The mission
recommends that the Deputy Special Representative should also
consult with the two parties on the exchange of prisoners of war and
the release of political detainees, so that those issues could be
removed from the timetable and linked closely to the commencement of
the transitional period.
53. Finally, the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General should give immediate attention to problems
associated with the registration of refugees called for in the
settlement plan, including the time required for this process and
the resources made available to date. UNHCR should take steps to
ensure that commencement of voluntary repatriation of refugees not
be delayed.
54. The mission calls attention to the fact that one of MINURSO’s
main successes has been the establishment and maintenance of the
cease-fire. It was very clearly communicated to the mission that in
the event of MINURSO’s withdrawal before completing its mandate,
the risk of a return to some form of hostilities would increase.
55. In its continuing consideration of this issue, the Security
Council needs to keep in mind the stake it has in ensuring the
credibility of the process.
56. Finally, the mission acknowledges that some progress has been
made in the identification process in recent weeks and underscores
that, while fairness must be guaranteed, such progress will have to
be sustained and improved significantly to allow the referendum to
take place early next year.
