Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning 
Western Sahara

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1349 (2001) of 27 April 2001, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 June 2001 and requested me to provide an assessment of the situation before the end of that mandate. The Security Council acted in the expectation that the parties, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, would continue to try to resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464) and try to agree upon a mutually acceptable political solution to their dispute over Western Sahara. The present report covers developments since my previous report to the Council, dated 24 April 2001 (S/2001/398).

3. On 5 May 2001, my Personal Envoy met with President Bouteflika and other senior Algerian officials in Algiers to present a draft “Framework agreement on the status of Western Sahara” (see annex I), which he was confident the Kingdom of Morocco would support. The Algerian authorities promised to study the document and revert to my Personal Envoy with their comments. On 22 May 2001, President Bouteflika addressed letters to my Personal Envoy and myself, along with a memorandum containing Algeria’s comments on the proposed framework agreement (see annex II and enclosure). In his letter to my Personal Envoy, President Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for Mr. Baker’s efforts and perseverance in settling the question of Western Sahara. He pointed out that, in Algeria’s view, the proposed document presented certain weaknesses and imbalances, as outlined in the memorandum attached to his letter. He added that Algeria’s point of view translated its concern in succeeding in getting out of a crisis that had lagged on for 26 years, if not by giving complete satisfaction to each of the parties, by at least equitably distributing the dissatisfaction and sacrifices imposed on each party. He expressed his willingness to offer to my Personal Envoy, either directly or through diplomatic channels, all the clarification that might be needed concerning Algeria’s communication.

4. While the Security Council has the opportunity to study Algeria’s response to the proposed framework (annex II, enclosure), it may be useful to also review the analysis of that memorandum prepared by the Secretariat (see annex III).

5. On 5 May 2001, my Personal Envoy also met with the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and other members of his party in Tindouf, with whom he reviewed the proposed framework agreement. Mr. Abdelaziz responded by saying that anything other than independence meant integration with Morocco and that he did not want to consider or discuss the framework proposal.

6. The Frente POLISARIO coordinator with MINURSO, Emhamed Khaddad, met with my Personal Envoy in Houston, on 31 May 2001, and with me in New York, on 4 June. Mr. Khaddad delivered letters addressed to my Personal Envoy and myself from Secretary-General Abdelaziz, along with official proposals of the Frente POLISARIO aimed at overcoming the obstacles preventing the implementation of the settlement plan (see annex IV and enclosure). While the Security Council has the opportunity to study the POLISARIO proposals, it may also be useful to review the analysis of these proposals prepared by the Secretariat (see annex V).

8. In my last report I indicated that preparations by the Moroccan military authorities for the construction of an asphalted road in the Guerguerat area of Western Sahara, at the south-western corner of the Territory, had been suspended at the request of MINURSO (S/2001/398, para. 4). In mid-May, with signs that work on the road had resumed, MINURSO and several Member States contacted the Moroccan authorities and requested that they again suspend the road construction. Subsequent MINURSO patrols confirmed that no roadwork was under way (see para. 15 below).

10. On 2 June 2001, the Chairman of the Identification Commission, Eduardo Vetere, had to resume his duties at the United Nations Office in Vienna, after completing his two-year assignment with MINURSO. I should like to pay tribute to Mr. Vetere for his outstanding service with MINURSO as Chairman of the Identification Commission and as Officer-in-Charge of MINURSO in the absence of my Special Representative from the mission area. I wish him well in his future endeavours.

13. During the reporting period, discussions continued between MINURSO and the Frente POLISARIO, at various levels, to ease or lift the restrictions imposed by the latter on the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers east of the defensive sand-wall (berm) since last January. To that effect, the Force Commander met with the Frente POLISARIO on 23 May 2001. Despite these efforts no significant progress can be reported towards the lifting of these restrictions. As reported in my two previous reports to the Security Council (S/2001/148 and S/2001/398), MINURSO ground patrols are not allowed closer to Frente POLISARIO combat units or observation posts than 800 metres and are required to be escorted at all times by Frente POLISARIO liaison officers. Large tracts of land south and east of the MINURSO team site at Agwanit are still out of bounds. MINURSO air reconnaissance is still limited to the 30-kilometres restricted area immediately east of the berm and has to follow Frente POLISARIO-approved air routes.

14. On the western side of the berm, MINURSO military patrols continued to visit and inspect Royal Moroccan Army ground units greater than company size, in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army. From 7 to 22 May 2001, MINURSO military observers confirmed the destruction, by the Royal Moroccan Army, of about 3,000 anti-tank mines, 37,000 anti-personnel mines and 27,000 detonators and munitions in the Ankesh area, 20 kilometres from Smara. In total, 7.5 tons of mines and explosives have been destroyed by the Royal Moroccan Army during the operation monitored by MINURSO.

15. On 28 April 2001, a MINURSO air reconnaissance patrol reported preparatory work by a civilian company for the beginning of construction of a portion of a road in the Guerguerat area (S/2001/398, paras. 4 and 5). On 12 May, construction work on a two-lane earthen road through the berm across the buffer strip towards the Mauritanian border was reported by a MINURSO air patrol. On 20 May, during a meeting with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, the Royal Moroccan Army Southern Military Region Commander, General Bennani, informed them that the preparatory work on the road had been suspended. Subsequent MINURSO observation of the site confirmed the suspension of the work and, subsequently, the withdrawal of road construction equipment from the area.

18. The operational base of UNHCR in Rabouni, near three of the four Tindouf camps, and its outpost at the fourth one, camp Dakhla, facilitated its coordination and monitoring role in the camps. UNHCR conducted its very first international refugee law workshop at that base, from 25 to 29 May 2001. Some 80 refugees and their leadership attended the workshop, which focused on refugee rights and obligations, voluntary repatriation under UNHCR’s mandate and principles, as well as special topics regarding refugee women. UNHCR was requested by the refugees to conduct subject-specific international refugee law training at the camp level. UNHCR also conducted training in refugee law for MINURSO’s civilian police in Laayoune.

20. I should like to recall that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1282 (1999) of 14 December 1999, which requested me to report on prospects for progress in implementing the settlement plan within a reasonable period of time, my report of 17 February 2000 (S/2000/131, paras. 15-29) gave a detailed account of the actions taken by the United Nations to that effect. That report also gave a full and frank description of all the difficulties encountered by MINURSO and previous Special Representatives in that process.

21. As pointed out in that report, with the exception of the monitoring of the ceasefire in effect since 6 September 1991, none of the main provisions of the settlement plan has been fully implemented since the establishment of MINURSO, because of fundamental differences between the parties over its interpretation. It is particularly important to note that perhaps the main problem in implementing the settlement plan is the United Nations inability to implement any measures unless both parties agree to cooperate with it (S/22464, para. 55). The establishment of the electorate body for the referendum in Western Sahara has been, and remains to date, the most contentious issue and one of the main reasons for the successive deadlocks in the work of MINURSO.

22. The difficulties in determining who among the Saharans is eligible to take part in the referendum were due, in particular, to the characteristics of the Saharan population, notably its nomadic tradition and the tribal structure of the society. In that respect, it was noted in the report of former Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, dated 19 December 1991 (S/23299, annex), that: “because of their nomadic way of life, the people of the Territory move easily across the borders to the neighbouring countries, where they are received by members of their tribes or even of their families. This ebb and flow of people across the borders of the Territory makes it difficult to take a complete census of the inhabitants of Spanish Sahara and also poses the complex problem of the identification of the Saharans of the Territory and makes it even more difficult to take a satisfactory census of refugees”.

23. Thus, because of the ill-defined nature of tribal affiliation with the Territory, this fundamental issue became, from the outset, a subject of deep contention between the two parties. The Frente POLISARIO maintained that, under the settlement plan, only the 74,000 people counted in the 1974 Spanish census of the Territory should take part in the referendum. Morocco held the opposite view, namely, that thousands of additional members of Saharan tribes are equally qualified to vote, including those who were in the Territory at the time of the census but had not been counted, those who had fled to Morocco in previous years and those from regions that were formerly part of the Territory but were then retroceded by Spain to Morocco in the 1950s and 1960s (and are now part of southern Morocco) (S/2000/131, para. 18).

24. Against this background, the identification process, and indeed any activity in implementing the settlement plan other than the maintenance of the ceasefire, came to a standstill at the end of 1995 when the Frente POLISARIO found it unacceptable to proceed with the identification of members of the “Tribus del Norte” and “Costeras del Sur” (listed in the 1974 Spanish census of the Territory as categories H and J), in particular those known as H41, H61 and J51/52. MINURSO’s civilian presence was scaled down to the political office and the military was also reduced by 20 per cent (see S/1996/343).

25. In an effort to break the deadlock, I appointed James A. Baker III as my Personal Envoy, in March of 1997, to reassess the feasibility of implementing the settlement plan. Following a tour of the region where he met with the leadership of both parties and neighbouring countries, Mr. Baker informed me that neither side had indicated any willingness to pursue any political solution other than implementing the settlement plan.

26. My Personal Envoy believed that the only realistic way to assess the feasibility of implementing the plan would be by arranging direct talks between the parties. To that effect, he organized four rounds of direct talks under his auspices where agreement was reached on issues that had caused the deadlock in the identification process, on a code of conduct for the holding of the referendum campaign and on a compromise formula for the cantonment of the Frente POLISARIO troops (see S/1997/742). In addition, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the settlement plan for the return of refugees and the release of prisoners of war and Saharan political detainees. This was the first time that the two parties held substantive direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations, where they tried to resolve problems related to the implementation of the settlement plan.

27. While the identification process resumed in December of 1997, with the successful conclusion of the Houston agreements, it was not long before difficulties surfaced again resulting in further delays and interruptions. Thus, among numerous other technical and substantial proposals over the years, a package of United Nations draft protocols dealing with identification and appeals was submitted to the parties in October 1998 in an attempt to overcome the remaining difficulties in this process. Eventually, in April and May 1999, the parties formally accepted protocols and operational directives, albeit with reservations and misgivings for opposite reasons (S/1999/554 and S/1999/555), for the completion of the identification process and for the appeals (S/1999/483/Add.1).

28. With the continued efforts of at least three Special Representatives, as well as those of my Personal Envoy, the identification process was finally completed at the end of 1999. However, MINURSO was then faced with a total of 131,038 appeals. Judging from the Mission’s past experience with both parties, whose concerns and attempts at controlling the identification process have been the principal cause of the difficulties and delays encountered, the appeals process could be even lengthier and more cumbersome and contentious than the identification itself.

29. It should further be recalled that, in addition to the appeals process and the establishment of the final voter list, the following key issues remain unresolved under the settlement plan: the release of prisoners of war and of Saharan political detainees; the fulfilment of security conditions for the Saharan returnees eligible to vote and their immediate families (as well as agreement to a UNHCR draft protocol for the repatriation of refugees, submitted to the parties, Algeria and Mauritania in November 1988); possible problems related to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign, in particular with regard to the role of the existing (Moroccan) security forces; and, perhaps most importantly given the United Nations experience in other areas, the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the results of the referendum. It bears repeating that the full cooperation of the two parties as well as the cooperation and support of Algeria and Mauritania must be ensured as essential conditions for the effective implementation of the settlement plan and for the fulfilment of the mandate of MINURSO (S/22464, para. 55). It is perhaps understandable that this full cooperation is difficult to achieve given the “winner-take-all” nature of the referendum called for under the settlement plan.

30. Throughout the 10 years since the United Nations undertook to implement the settlement plan for Western Sahara, it was understood that direct talks between the parties were essential to the achievement of the compromises and understandings that would be necessary for implementing the settlement plan in full and finding a durable solution to the dispute over the Western Sahara. My predecessor’s Special Representative, Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, organized such talks, for the first time under the auspices of the United Nations, from 17 to 19 July 1993, at Laayoune. Notwithstanding difficulties in the preparation and organization of the talks and other problems, mostly of a procedural nature, the delegations of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO met in the presence of the Special Representative and United Nations observers. While it would have been unrealistic to expect a major breakthrough on substantial issues, nor was this the primary aim of the talks, it was an encouraging sign that this exploratory dialogue was held in a positive spirit, marked by restraint and respect.

31. An attempt was made to resume direct talks on 25 October 1993, in New York. While each party was granted, under a memorandum of understanding with the Special Representative, the right to choose the composition of their delegation, the presence of former Frente POLISARIO officials in the Moroccan delegation was not considered by the Frente POLISARIO to be conducive to a propitious climate for dialogue. Under the circumstances, the meeting could not take place as scheduled.

32. During 1994 and 1995, the United Nations and a Member State made further unsuccessful attempts at bringing the parties together. In July 1996, the then Acting Special Representative organized a meeting between the parties in Geneva, which was secret at the time, to which many conditions were attached by both sides. The United Nations was not present at the meeting, which was attended by decision makers from both sides, but had no planned agenda as the parties wanted to establish confidence and demonstrate commitment to courtesy and constructive dialogue. Both sides expressed satisfaction with that encounter and agreed to meet in Morocco in September 1996. The meeting took place as planned and a second one was scheduled for later that month. During the second meeting, the head of the Frente POLISARIO delegation mentioned the notion of independence for Western Sahara, thus transcending the understanding between the parties to discuss options on the autonomy/regionalization scale only. Morocco then made it clear that under the circumstances, the Frente POLISARIO’s expected meeting with the King would not take place so long as Moroccan sovereignty was not recognized as a prerequisite to the discussion of any proposals.

33. The three rounds of direct talks held under the auspices of my Personal Envoy in 2000 only served to highlight the differing points of view of the two parties in the implementation of the settlement plan. Neither side, in spite of my Personal Envoy’s request, presented any concrete proposals that would help resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the plan. The Frente POLISARIO agreed to family visits as a confidence-building measure but Morocco would not.

34. During the first round, in May 2000, the Frente POLISARIO identified two areas of difficulty, namely, the conduct of the appeals process and the repatriation of refugees. It reiterated its promise to respect the results of the referendum of self-determination and stressed that it would be up to the Security Council to take the necessary measures to ensure respect of the referendum results (S/2000/683, paras. 3-4).

35. Morocco identified four areas that, in its view, were impeding the implementation of the settlement plan: the conduct of the appeals process; the reversal of the identification results for some 7,000 applicants, which, in Morocco’s view, should be reinstated; the issue of Saharans who had reached voting age after December 1993 but had not been included in the identification process; and the repatriation of Saharan refugees. Stressing that the right to self-determination meant the right of all Saharans to decide their fate, Morocco further indicated that it would not take part in a referendum where any Saharans who might be entitled to vote were not allowed to do so. With respect to the appeals process, Morocco identified two areas of concern: the issue of admissibility of appeals, which in its view should be limited to a procedural review; and that of the concurrent testimony by two tribal leaders (sheikhs), which Morocco considered unacceptable since it would be prejudicial to the appellants as it had been during the identification process. Morocco stated that during the appeals process it would not agree to submit testimony by new witnesses in the presence of the Frente POLISARIO sheikhs (ibid., paras. 5 and 6).

36. It may be noted that the concurrent oral testimony by two tribal leaders (one from each side, of the same tribal faction) was not called for in the settlement plan. That formula was devised by the Identification Commission as a way of reassuring each party that its interests in the identification process would be safeguarded and, thus, enabling that process to start. In practice, however, the formula proved to be one of the most contentious. In addition to legitimate difficulties in recognizing some applicants, especially from the opposite side after so many years of separation, problems of a political nature soon emerged, revealing that the sheikhs’ testimony essentially followed their own party’s position. Indeed, some tribal leaders proved to be so biased against applicants from the opposite side that either affected party eventually questioned the veracity of their testimony, as well as the decisions taken by the Identification Commission on the basis of that testimony. Considering that the tribal leaders would play the same role in the appeals as in the identification process, there is no cause to hope that the parties would not attempt to prejudice testimony during the appeals hearings.

37. As indicated in my report of 17 February 2000 (S/2000/131), experience over the past 10 years has shown that every time the United Nations has proposed a technical solution to bridge the parties’ differing interpretation of a given provision of the settlement plan, a new difficulty arises, requiring yet another round of protracted consultations. It was for this reason that during the second round of consultations, in June 2000, my Personal Envoy asked the parties to come up with concrete proposals that would bridge their differences and would help resolve the difficulties in implementing the settlement plan. Since neither side did so, he asked the parties to meet again in order to arrive at a political solution, explaining that for such a solution several options existed. There could be a negotiated agreement for full integration of Western Sahara with Morocco, or for full independence, although, in his view, neither prospect appeared likely. Alternatively, a negotiated agreement could produce a solution somewhere between those two results. Still another political solution could be an agreement that would permit a successful implementation of the settlement plan. He reiterated to the parties that, should they agree to discuss a political solution other than the settlement plan, they would not prejudice their final positions since according to the rules of the consultations nothing would be agreed to until everything had been agreed to.

38. During the third round of consultations, in September 2000, both parties again failed to come up with specific proposals to resolve the multiple problems in the implementation of the settlement plan that both parties would agree to. The Frente POLISARIO was of the view that the remaining obstacles could be overcome with the cooperation of the parties and expressed its willingness to engage in a substantive discussion on the implementation of the appeals procedures immediately.

39. Morocco, after recalling in some detail the many obstacles to the settlement plan, was of the view that the difficulties encountered were not of a mere technical nature. In Morocco’s view, there were errors and distortions in the implementation of the plan, which could not satisfy the thousands of rejected applicants. Although Morocco had sufficient reasons to reject the manner in which the settlement plan was being implemented, it had not done so because it wanted to facilitate the task of my Personal Envoy and to cooperate. Nevertheless, Morocco was of the opinion that, despite all good will, the difficulties faced in the implementation of the plan could not be overcome.

40. My Personal Envoy pointed out to the parties that he had been hearing the same arguments and pledges of cooperation since 1997. He expressed scepticism about the validity of such pledges and his regret that the parties’ positions on the outstanding issues had not changed. My Personal Envoy recalled that, at the start of the meeting, he had asked the parties whether they had come with new positions on any issue. Neither had done so. He felt that there was no political will on either side. He reiterated to them that there were many ways to achieve self-determination. It could be achieved through war or revolution; it could be achieved through elections, but this required good will; or it could be achieved through agreement, as had been done by parties to other disputes. My Personal Envoy asked the parties whether they would be willing to try the latter route without abandoning the settlement plan. The Frente POLISARIO reiterated its commitment to the settlement plan and its readiness to discuss the appeals process but added that it was not ready to discuss anything outside that plan.

41. While also committed to the settlement plan, Morocco expressed the view that the way in which it was being implemented meant that two-thirds of the Saharan population would be excluded from the referendum. The Moroccan delegation then expressed the wish to further explore other ways and means to settle the conflict. In response to Security Council resolution 1309 (2000), which had asked the parties to search for a definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara, Morocco was prepared to initiate a sincere and frank dialogue with the other party on the dispute that had divided them for almost 25 years. In rejecting the Moroccan proposal, the Frente POLISARIO reiterated that it would cooperate and adhere to any dialogue that would be within the framework of the settlement plan since, in its view, other solutions had been overtaken by events. My Personal Envoy noted that, while no one was abandoning the settlement plan, this was the first time that Morocco had expressed readiness to engage in a direct dialogue.

42. Following the third round of consultations, in September 2000, my Personal Envoy was of the view, which I shared, that further meetings of the parties would not succeed and indeed could be counterproductive unless the Government of Morocco, as administrative power of the Territory, was prepared to offer or support some devolution of authority for all inhabitants and former inhabitants of the Territory that was genuine, substantive and in keeping with international norms.

43. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/262 of 14 June 2001, appropriated the amount of US$ 48.8 million, equivalent to a monthly rate of some $4.1 million, for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendation contained in paragraph 59 below on the extension of MINURSO’s mandate, the cost of maintaining the Mission will be within the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly. At the same time, in connection with the suspension of the Identification Commission’s activities, if approved by the Council, I shall reassess the Mission’s resource requirements and revert to the General Assembly with the consequential adjustments, if necessary.

44. As at 31 May 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $93.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,320.2 million. The total expenditure for the MINURSO operation is projected to reach some $420 million for the period from its inception through 30 June 2001.

45. As outlined in section III of the present report, the United Nations has gone through a long and arduous process over the past 10 years in its efforts to implement the settlement plan. This process has involved my efforts and those of two previous Secretaries-General, as well as those of five Special Representatives and my Personal Envoy. In addition, the Security Council and individual Member States have attempted several times to unblock the impasse in the implementation process. During that period, the timetable for the implementation of the plan has been revised several times, with the referendum date moving further into the future each time, so that it is in serious doubt that it will ever be within reach.

46. In 1988, proposals for the settlement of the dispute were submitted to the parties by the then Secretary-General and the Chairman of OAU involving the holding of a free and fair referendum for self-determination, by which the people of the Territory would choose between two options: independence or integration with Morocco. Both parties accepted the proposals in principle, while the United Nations provided both sides with additional clarifications on points of particular concern to them, before proceeding with the implementation phase. It was understood at that time that, during the implementation process, there would have to be direct talks between the parties in order to achieve the compromises and understandings necessary for implementing the settlement plan in full and finding a durable solution to their dispute. Attempts by the United Nations to organize such meetings where substantive issues would be discussed failed until the four rounds held in 1997 under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, which resulted in the Houston Agreements.

47. Because of the parties’ unwillingness to work together to resolve the various problems, the United Nations started submitting proposals to them to bridge their differences. As a result, both sides became accustomed to receiving from the United Nations suggestions and technical solutions each time there was a problem, which the parties, in turn, would proceed to revise or dilute through long and arduous negotiations until they were satisfied that they had safeguarded their own best interests. The process thus became a zero-sum game, which each side felt it absolutely had to win since, owing to the nature of the agreement that the United Nations was trying to implement, the referendum would produce one winner and one loser and the stakes were therefore extremely high.

48. This resulted in successive deadlocks in the identification process, which was the only substantial element of the settlement plan after the establishment of the ceasefire on 6 September 1991 that the United Nations began to try to implement. As pointed out in paragraph 21 above, all other key issues remain unresolved in the implementation process, namely: the release of prisoners of war and presumed Saharan political detainees; problems related to the repatriation of refugees, including security concerns; possible problems related to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign; and the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the results of the referendum. More significantly, as stated above, the settlement plan requires the cooperation of the two parties as well as that of the two neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, as essential conditions for its implementation (S/22464, para. 55).

49. Nevertheless, over the years, the United Nations continued with its efforts to convince the parties to cooperate in the belief that, through continuing engagement, they would find solutions leading to a smooth and consensual implementation of the settlement plan. It is possible that by doing so the United Nations erred on the side of unfounded optimism and persisted in its efforts longer that it should have.

50. Recently, as indicated in paragraph 6 of the present report, the Frente POLISARIO presented to my Personal Envoy and to myself proposals aimed at overcoming the obstacles hindering the implementation process. I would like to express my appreciation and that of my Personal Envoy to the Frente POLISARIO for having submitted these proposals. However, as noted in the present report, (see annex V), these proposals would either require agreement by Morocco, action by the Security Council or further clarification. Most importantly, these proposals cannot address one of the most crucial problems hindering the implementation of the settlement plan, namely that the full cooperation of both parties is required in order for the United Nations to implement any measures (S/24646, para. 55).

51. As may be recalled, when I appointed my Personal Envoy in 1997, I asked him to undertake a fresh assessment of the situation whose purpose would be threefold: to assess, in consultation with the parties, the implementability of the settlement plan in its present form; to examine whether there were any adjustments, acceptable to the parties that would significantly improve the chances of implementing it in the near future; and, if not, to recommend other possible ways of resolving the conflict (see S/1997/742).

52. Given the history of the United Nations operation in Western Sahara over the past 10 years, including the last four years during which my Personal Envoy has been involved in the search for acceptable ways to implement the settlement plan, and the failure of the parties to come up with any concrete proposals during the three rounds of consultations held from June to September 2000, my Personal Envoy has concluded that there are serious doubts as to whether the settlement plan can be implemented in its present form in a way that will result in an early, durable and agreed resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara. I fully concur with this view.

53. Adjustments to the settlement plan, such as that of the concurrent testimony by tribal leaders (see para. 36 above), which was worked out with the agreement of both sides, proved just as contentious as other provisions and did not resolve the long-term problems. It is, therefore, equally doubtful whether any other adjustments to the settlement plan would resolve these problems, since the endgame would still produce one winner and one loser. Furthermore, any substantial adjustments to the settlement plan, such as changes to the two referendum options under the plan of integration or independence, or a specific United Nations mandate to deal with the post-referendum situation, would require the mutual agreement of the parties and an enforcement mechanism approved by the Security Council.

54. It is therefore my hope and that of my Personal Envoy that Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania will agree to meet, as parties, either directly, or through proximity talks under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, to discuss with specificity the elements of the proposed framework agreement, which aims at reaching an early, durable and agreed resolution of the conflict over Western Sahara in a way that does not foreclose self-determination, but indeed provides for it. I especially invite Algeria, which has indicated its willingness to offer my Personal Envoy all clarifications that might be needed regarding certain weaknesses and imbalances that it sees in the proposed framework agreement, to engage as a party in these discussions and to negotiate, under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, any specific changes it would like to see in the proposed document that would make it acceptable to it.

55. The proposed framework agreement is not unlike agreements used to address similar situations elsewhere where a devolution of authority to the inhabitants of a non-self-governing territory is granted with the final status of the territory to be determined by a referendum. The proposed framework agreement confers on the population of Western Sahara the right to elect their own executive and legislative bodies and to have exclusive competence over local governmental administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, environmental policy, housing and urban development, water and electricity, roads and other basic infrastructure. It is worth noting that the procedure set forth in the proposed framework for election of the Executive should result in the election of the candidates supported by the Frente POLISARIO. Within five years, a referendum on the final status of the Territory would be held.

56. As my Personal Envoy informed the parties during the consultations held in London on 28 June 2000, should they agree to discuss a political solution other than the implementation of the settlement plan, they would not prejudice their final positions since, according to the rule of the consultations, nothing would be agreed until everything had been agreed. Over the next five months, my Personal Envoy will invite Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania to engage, as parties, in direct or proximity talks, under his auspices, to discuss the proposed framework agreement and, if possible, to negotiate such changes as would make it acceptable to all of them. I hope that the Security Council will fully support these continuing efforts.

57. While the discussions on the proposed framework go on, the settlement plan will not be abandoned, but it will be put on hold. At the same time, the Identification Commission of MINURSO and its support staff would suspend their activities, after ensuring that all identification records are safely stored. The Special Representative would be requested to look further into what other non-essential staff can be reduced.

58. Should my Personal Envoy decide to continue with the discussions about the proposed framework agreement after the proposed five-month period in order to try and negotiate such changes in the draft framework agreement that would make it acceptable to Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, it is my intention to recommend to the Security Council that MINURSO’s mandate be extended to permit time for such negotiations. If, on the other hand, by the end of that period, my Personal Envoy should conclude that it would not be worthwhile to continue with the consultations, the Security Council could decide to review the mandate of MINURSO and consider what further role it can play under the circumstances.

59. It is my sincere hope that Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania will each engage constructively, as parties, under the auspices of my Personal Envoy to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara. For the reasons outlined above, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for five months, until 30 November 2001, to give time to my Personal Envoy to conduct consultations on the proposed framework agreement on the future status of Western Sahara.

60. Twenty-six long years have elapsed since the outbreak of this conflict. It took five years to negotiate the United Nations settlement proposals and plan and 10 more years to try to implement that plan. In the meantime, an entire new generation of Saharan refugees was born and grew up in the Tindouf camps, while many among the first generation have already died without being able to return home. The proposed framework agreement offers what may be the last window of opportunity for years to come. This opportunity ought to be seized by all parties concerned as it is in the interests of the people of Western Sahara as well as those of the countries in the region. It is high time to settle the dispute over Western Sahara, so that the Maghreb region may finally focus on cooperation and development and enable all its people to look to a better future.